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Abstract 
We document a large and persistent anomaly in the UK car insurance market over the 
period 2012-13: insurance companies charged a higher premium for third-party (liability) 
insurance than comprehensive insurance (which includes third-party).  Furthermore, 
some companies charged higher premiums for comprehensive policies with larger 
deductibles.  In contrast with current theories of adverse or propitious selection, our 
evidence suggests both that consumers are too confused or too poorly informed to 
arbitrage between policy types and that sellers of car insurance do not implement the 
incentive-compatibility constraints at the heart of consumer demand theory. This 
particular insurance market is much less sophisticated than that characterized by 
modern microeconomic theory.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we document two significant anomalies in the advertized premiums for car 
insurance in the UK over the period 2012-13.  First, we show that the premium for 
comprehensive insurance was substantially less than that for third-party (liability) 
insurance: since comprehensive insurance automatically includes third-party insurance 
as well as insurance of the buyer, ceteris paribus it must be strictly more valuable to the 
buyer and strictly more costly to provide by the insurer.  Second, within the 
comprehensive insurance market, policies with higher deductibles are frequently more 
expensive than policies with lower deductibles, despite the fact that a higher deductible 
makes the policy less valuable. 
These anomalies require a failure of arbitrage on behalf of buyers: for example, an 
individual who purchased third-party insurance1 could have been strictly better off by 
choosing to buy comprehensive insurance from the same provider.  Correspondingly the 
anomaly also requires a failure by insurers to provide menus of policies that satisfy an 
obvious incentive-compatibility constraint, although this need not be irrational so long 
as consumers persist in their current behaviour (i.e. there is no need to provide 
incentive-compatible menus of prices). 
It might be thought that this anomaly must be a disequilibrium that would quickly be 
rectified as agents learned about it.  In fact the anomaly has persisted for almost two 
years: our data were collected in June 2012 and June 2013; the anomaly continued into 
2014 and 2015 (when it was slightly smaller).  During this period, two long-anticipated 
changes affected prices.  First, in April 2013 the UK law on personal injury claims was 
changed to reduce the cost of litigation and reduce fraudulent claims and it became 
harder to avoid insuring a vehicle.2  Second, insurers were required to undertake a 
                                                 
1 Including one of the authors of this paper. 
2 Until April 2013 it was not necessary to insure an unused vehicle kept off the road and 
this made it easier to avoid the legal requirement to purchase insurance.  Where an 
accident occurs and the guilty party does not have insurance (or cannot be traced after 
the accident), pay-outs to the injured party are made by the Motor Insurance Bureau, 
which raises its funds from a levy on insurance companies, so uninsured vehicles form 
an extra cost for insurance companies.   
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substantial re-pricing of all insurance products due to the ruling of the European Court 
of Justice (2011) Test Achats, which banned gender-specific pricing.  The ECJ ruling was 
announced on 1 March 2011, but only became effective on 20 December 2012, allowing 
insurance companies plenty of time to reconsider optimal pricing policies.  Many 
contemporary publications document the discussions within the insurance industry 
about how to implement the change.3  The ECJ ruling was also widely reported in the 
British popular press at this time and so many relatively unsophisticated consumers are 
likely to have read advice that they should shop around to see how prices had changed.  
Yet the pricing anomaly in 2013 was quantitatively similar to that of 2012. 
We dismiss at the outset the possibility that our price data are completely wrong.  Our 
data consist of quotes downloaded by two different researchers at different points of 
time using dozens of different searches.  We have also informally contacted companies 
to get quotes and later in the paper we provide some corroborative evidence from other 
publications. The anomaly is too large to be reversed by small differences between 
quoted prices and prices actually paid.  
Nor is it the case that the quotes for third-party insurance apply to a market that does 
not exist. According to data provided by the Association of British Insurers, ABI (2014), 
in 2013 the comprehensive (henceforth CP) market was 93% of the market measured by 
premiums.  The remaining 7% of policies are either third-party (henceforth TP) or third-
party, fire and theft (henceforth TPFT).  We do not have data on the breakdown of CP 
versus TP/TPFT policies by age, but are assured by individuals within the industry that 
TP/TPFT policies are predominantly purchased by the young. Back-of envelope 
calculations suggest that if TP/TPFT policies are only purchased by the young then the 
proportion of young drivers buying such policies may be about 10%, which is a significant 
minority of the market.4  The ABI data also suggest that CP is becoming more popular: 
                                                 
3 The original Gender Directive is found in Council of the European Union (2004); the 
relevant ECJ ruling is Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats 
ASBL, initiated on 18 March 2009 and concluded on 1 March 2011.  Guidance on the 
directive was issued on 12 December 2011 (European Commission, 2011).  The UK position 
from July 2012 is described in HM Treasury (2012). 
4 Our calculations to reach the figure of 10% are described in the appendix.  
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the non-CP share of the market was twice as high in 2003 (14%).  If we had data showing 
that the pricing anomaly were long standing, then a falling share of TP/TPFT might 
indicate that consumers were adjusting to the relative prices of CP and TP/TPFT, 
although the speed of adjustment would be very slow and the trend for CP policies to 
form a larger share of the market is also observed in other European countries where (so 
far as we can ascertain) there is no such pricing anomaly (European Economics, 2009).     
One possible reason for third-party policies to be more expensive than corresponding 
comprehensive policies is a selection effect: suppose that the unobserved risk 
characteristics of TP policy holders are different from those of CP policy holders.  If this 
is the case, then we can infer that CP policy holders are lower risk than TP from the 
prices of the different products,5 which is the exact opposite of the separating 
equilibrium suggested by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where high-risk types buy more 
insurance, often referred to as the positive correlation property.  Chiappori et al. (2006) 
show that the positive correlation property is robust to changes in the precise 
assumptions about the insurance market and so forms an appropriate test of the theory, 
but the review of the empirical literature by Cohen and Siegelman (2010) finds little 
convincing evidence for adverse selection.  Among the papers cited in their review, 
several find a statistically insignificant negative correlation (Chiappori and Salanié, 
2000; Dionne et al. 2001) and one of the specifications in Saito (2006) has a statistically 
significant negative correlation.  More recently, Shi et al. (2012) find evidence for positive 
correlation for some groups of drivers in the Singapore market, but not all. However, all 
of these papers are analysing situations where there is a trade-off:  it costs more to buy 
more insurance, whereas in our data, it costs less to buy more insurance.   
The other main view of heterogeneous risk types is that there is ‘propitious selection’ 
(Hemenway, 1990, 1992; also referred to as ‘advantageous selection’ by De Meza and 
Webb, 2001), where agents have different attitudes to risk: in particular more risk-averse 
individuals may be naturally more careful and hence less likely to have an accident and 
this might result in a negative correlation (contra the suggested positive correlation for 
adverse selection).  Evidence for risk heterogeneity has been found in the car insurance 
                                                 
5 Our approach here is similar to that of Finkelstein and Poterba (2002), who infer the 
risk characteristics of different types of annuities from the prices. 
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market by Cohen and Einav (2007) and elsewhere by Finkelstein and McGarry 
(2006).  De Meza and Webb (2001) show that the outcome of such a situation is a pooling 
equilibrium, where the more-risk-averse/low-risk individuals are happy to buy the same 
contract as the less-risk-averse/high-risk individuals because the higher utility value of 
the insurance policy to low-risk individuals offsets the actuarial unfairness arising from 
the cross subsidy to high-risk customers. However, De Donder and Hindriks (2009) 
suggest that a combination of propitious selection and moral hazard might result in a 
separating equilibrium displaying the positive correlation property.  None of these 
models are consistent with the pricing anomaly that we observe.  
An alternative approach to tackling the anomaly is that of Campbell (2006) who notes 
that households may face more complex constraints than financial firms and that 
apparently surprising behaviour may be due to those constraints.  It is not clear what 
complex constraints exist in our scenario, so it is more likely that the anomaly is due to 
Campbell’s other explanation for consumer behaviour, namely that they make mistakes.  
These mistakes could be due to bounded rationality along the lines of Kahneman (2003) 
or could be due to individuals not knowing the relevant prices (limited information). It 
is possible that bounded rationality leads to inadequate search for information and so 
the two effects are linked. Our data on car insurance premiums do not allow us to 
identify these explanations, but we shall provide information about the UK car insurance 
market that suggests both are important. 
Our paper, in conclusion, provides an interesting case of an insurance market anomaly.  
The most recent literature on anomalies include Sydnor (2010) on homeowner’s 
insurance, suggesting that consumers over insure by choosing low deductibles despite 
costs significantly above the expected value. Handel (2013) exploits a major change to 
insurance provision in a large firm to show that consumers suffer from inertia on health 
insurance plans, while Bhargava et al. (2015) find that employees at a large firm choose 
dominated health insurance options, resulting in substantial excess spending. 
Finally, Baker and Siegelman (2013) find irrationality in the purchasing of insurance for 
small value losses sold as an add-on to other products or services and Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (2004) document the existence of several insurance anomalies, reflecting a 
systematic tendency for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.    
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The rest of our paper fills out the detail of our argument and is structured as follows.  In 
section 2 we describe our data set and the two  pricing anomalies, viz., the relative price 
of TP and CP policies and the relationship  between price and deductible in the CP 
market.  Section 3 reviews some additional information about the UK car insurance 
market and suggests an explanation for the puzzle.  Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data for the UK Car Insurance Market 
The car insurance industry is described in Office of Fair Trading (2011), which suggests 
that in many ways the industry is highly competitive: the five-firm concentration ratio 
is only 55% and the ‘combined ratio’, or ratio of claims-plus-administration to premiums 
was 117% in 2011, suggesting that the industry as a whole made an underwriting loss. Car 
insurers also receive revenue from the returns on the invested premiums, but in the light 
of low risk-free returns due to quantitative easing, it is likely that this translated into a 
loss overall.  In recent years new providers such as supermarkets Tesco and Sainsbury’s 
have joined the market.  This suggests that the market is broadly competitive.  Total 
premiums are just less than 1% of UK GDP. 
Although OFT (2011) had concerns that consumers paid higher prices when they 
renewed a policy with an existing provider, the OFT’s survey reported that 73% of 
responses had sought quotes from other insurers when renewing and 72% had used an 
internet search engine (37% had used two or more).  There are currently four major 
internet search engines, of which three have links to an insurance provider and 
MoneySupermarket is independent.  We collected data for firms that provide quotes via 
MoneySupermarket: some firms do not provide a quote or do not provide a quote for 
every type of policy.  It is often possible to proceed directly from the internet search 
engine to an electronic form to purchase the insurance, or else the purchase can be made 
by telephone. 
We collected data for male and female policies in 2012 and unisex policies in 2013, for 
two ages (23 and 44) and for three occupations (solicitors, where the proportion of men 
and women are approximately equal; civil engineers, who are overwhelmingly male; 
social service managers, who are overwhelmingly female). Our applications requested 
insurance cover for a 23-year old with a three-year no-claims bonus, who was single and 
had no children; 44-year olds with a nine-year no-claim bonus, were married and had 
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two children.  Fifteen other pieces of information were required to obtain a quote such 
as type of car and mileage were held constant across all quotes and we requested quotes 
for a range of deductibles between zero and £500,6 although the quotes we received often 
had a different deductible (as the voluntary deductible is added to a compulsory 
deductible for many companies).   
There are three policy types in the United Kingdom: third party (TP), which is the 
minimum legal requirement; third party, fire and theft (TPFT) and comprehensive (CP).  
We have analysed a selection of insurance policy documents to confirm the precise 
differences between the policies, which is not always obvious from the summary 
provided by MoneySupermarket.  In a representative example the policy document 
contains seven chapters: all seven chapters apply to comprehensive policies; chapters A 
(liability insurance), C (fire and theft) and G (driving outside the UK) apply to TPFT; 
only chapters A and G apply to TP. The chapters applying only to comprehensive policies 
in our example were B (damage to the car, to be repaired or replaced); D (repair or 
replace broken windscreen and windows); E (death and injury insurance to the driver 
and partner); F (miscellaneous items such as medical expenses arising from an accident 
and theft of personal belongings from the car); H (legal assistance in claiming expenses 
in accidents where someone else is at fault); and J (provision of courtesy car if own car 
is being repaired). Items D and F were not provided automatically by all insurers and 
sometimes could be purchased additionally to a more basic policy.  The key point here 
is that the benefits of CP policies strictly exceed the benefits of TPFT, which strictly 
exceed those of TP.  We only collect data for CP and TP: we should expect TPFT to be 
slightly more expensive than TP; from some less detailed analysis we have done TPFT is 
sometimes slightly cheaper than TP, consistent with the ranking of prices being 
anomalous.  Nearly all TP quotes from MoneySupermarket had a compulsory zero 
deductible.  This is unsurprising as any claim is paid direct to the injured party, so the 
insurance company would have to reclaim the deductible from the policy holder, which 
might prove difficult or expensive.  Conversely nearly all CP policies had a minimum 
                                                 
6 N.b. in British English a deductible is an ‘excess’. 
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deductible: from reading the policy documents we know that this did not apply to the 
liability (TP) component of a CP policy (chapter A in the example given). 
We summarize the raw data for price quotes in Table 1, which shows that TP premiums 
are much higher than CP. 
Table 1 (simple averages of prices) about here 
Although these simple averages are not perfectly comparable because we do not take 
deductibles into account, they illustrate the broad picture fairly accurately.  From the 
first part of the table we see that for a man aged 23 in 2012 the mean premium was £2,694, 
which is a sufficiently large sum of money that we would expect there to be strong 
incentives to devote effort to finding a lower price.  To see how much the price could be 
reduced by switching, we compare the average TP price with the lowest-decile TP and 
CP prices (the lowest decile is used because the lowest price may be highly 
idiosyncratic).  We note also that young women pay much lower premiums than men 
and that 44-year olds pay less again, although at age 44 the difference between 
premiums for men and women is much smaller: in a small number of cases women pay 
more than men.  Unisex premiums in 2013 were lower but this might be due to successful 
reduction in fraudulent claims as noted in the introduction. 
Both TP and CP policies had up to five additional extras, which are either included 
automatically in the policy or are available for a higher price. In Table 2, we use the 
instances where the price of the additional extras is reported explicitly to estimate the 
value of these components. For example, although based on only one quote, it appears 
that the value of windscreen cover is £20. 
Table 2 (information on extras) about here 
If we compare the corresponding CP and TP policies within the same provider, we find 
that the CP policy always contains weakly more extras automatically than the TP policy.  
For example, approximately 86% of insurers provide windscreen cover automatically in 
a CP policy but not in the corresponding TP policy, suggesting that on average the 
windscreen cover alone should mean that the CP policies are worth more than TP 
policies by about 0.86 × £20 = £17.27. Performing similar calculations for  the other extras 
suggests that the on average figures in Tables 1 and 2 under-estimate the price of CP 
policies by just about £51 compared to TP policies: taking extras into account not only 
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does not explain the within-provider difference between TP and CP but makes it worse.  
Although there is wide variation between companies’ prices for a given policy type, the 
presence of extras does not explain the between-provider variation in TP or CP 
premiums either: some of the cheapest policies have more extras.7   
We now turn to a more formal comparison of TP and CP policies.  For each policy type 
we create a data set of the TP policy and lowest deductible CP policy offered by each 
firm.  We then estimate simple regressions of price on a constant and a dummy variable 
for a policy being TP for three sets of data: (i) the entire sample; (ii) the sub-sample of 
firms offering both TP and CP policies (matched pairs); (iii) the sub-sample of matched 
pairs for those firms whose prices were in the cheapest decile.  Our results for Solicitors 
are reported in Table 3; results for Civil Engineers and Social Service Mangers reported 
in the Appendix are quantitatively similar.  
Table 3 (comparison of TP and CP) about here 
Positive figures in the table denote higher TP than CP prices and the figures are in 
pounds sterling.  These statistics confirm the findings of Table 1: for example a male 
solicitor age 23 would have to pay one thousand pounds more to have a TP policy.  More 
interesting we see that even buying a TP policy from the same firm would typically cost 
£1078 more and most firms would be charging between £803 and £1432 for TP.  This 
conclusion is not due to the presence of firms charging very high prices: the firms with 
the cheapest policies similarly charge much more for TP.  Recall that all of these 
differences may be under-estimated by approximately £51 due to the issue of extras.  The 
anomaly is the same for men and women and persists from 2012 to 2013. 
We know of no other studies that have collected data similar to our own, but at this 
point we provide some corroborative evidence for the anomaly.  The UK’s Automobile 
Association has provided us with data showing that average premia for CP policies have 
been lower than average premia for TPFT policies since at least 2010. However, this does 
                                                 
7 A cross-section regression of 94 quotes (Female, Civil Engineer, age 23) on a constant 
and dummies for the five possible extras yields an R-squared of 0.043; none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant and some have the incorrect sign.  The cost of 
extras does not appear to depend on age, gender or occupation. 
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not compare quotes for exactly the same risks and is not conclusive evidence for an 
anomaly.     
A second piece of corroborative evidence is provided by the study of the European car 
insurance industry by Europe Economics (2009), which compares markets in Europe and 
the USA.8  The study collected price quotes for six hypothetical individual profiles in 
2008, three for TPFT and three for CP and again it is impossible to make a perfect 
comparison.  However, profiles 1 (22-year old, three year’s driving, no claims) and 5 (21-
year old, three year’s driving, no claims) are very similar on the factors with the largest 
effect on premiums: the average quote in the UK market for TPFT for profile 1 was £894 
and the average quote for CP for profile 5 was £785  (figures taken from European 
Economics, 2009; Table 8.3, p.289, and Table 8.9, p.308).  So TPFT was 14% more 
expensive than CP.  Other than Italy (where the market for CP insurance is tiny, only 
about 1% of the market), no other European market had TPFT insurance more expensive 
than CP: on average it was 43% lower in the EU.  
Since there is an anomaly between the TP and CP parts of the market, what can we say 
about the CP market, where we have information on deductibles?  The deductible 
consists of a compulsory deductible plus a voluntary deductible: the presence of a 
compulsory deductible effectively creates a minimum and this was usually strictly 
positive: for 23-year olds it was most commonly £150 or £400 in 2012 and £200 or £350 in 
2013; for 44-year olds the most common minimum deductibles allowed were £100 or £150 
in both 2012 and 2013.9 
We should expect that the higher the voluntary deductible, the lower the price: a 
negative price-deductible relationship is the relevant incentive compatibility constraint 
within the CP market.  In our data we observe that this relationship holds most, but not 
                                                 
8 Among other things, the report also shows that competition (ie the five-firm 
concentration ratio) in the UK car industry and combined ratio are similar to those of 
other markets and so the UK market is not peculiar in other respects. 
9 One of the most important ideas of the adverse-selection models is that firms use 
deductibles to control the quantity of insurance purchased.  Interestingly, if firms are 
using deductibles in this way, their approach is relatively simple: while the price of a 
policy depends upon gender and occupation, most firms have the same minimum 
deductible regardless of these two variables. 
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all of the time: a minority of providers charge a higher price for a policy with a voluntary 
deductible of £100 than for a policy with a voluntary deductible of zero.  Table 4 
illustrates the proportion of providers for which the policy with the higher deductible 
has the higher price.  The sums of money are not huge: for 23-year olds the additional 
cost of a £100-deductible policy, where positive, averages £9.49 for men in 2012; £6.14 for 
women in 2012 and £6.06 for unisex in 2013.  
Table 4 (anomalous price-deductible policies) about here 
Clearly a policy with a zero deductible and a lower price is strictly superior to a more 
expensive policy with a deductible of £100, so the observations which do not satisfy a 
negative price-deductible relationship are not consistent with conventional models of 
adverse selection (or any rational informed behaviour). However, as with the TP-CP 
anomaly, an individual getting quotes for insurance policies would not immediately see 
the trade-off between deductible and price: when requesting a quote one has to choose 
a preferred deductible and then receives quotes on that basis. To see the full menu of 
deductibles and prices it would be necessary to undertake multiple searches on different 
deductibles. 
Unlike the TP-CP comparison, this anomaly is confined to a minority of providers; from 
the second part of Table 4 we can see that very few of the cheapest providers displayed 
this anomaly and these were all for 23-year olds in 2012. Also, it is interesting to notice 
that the anomaly is substantially smaller for 44-year olds than 23-year olds. This could 
be related to the fact, documented for example by Cohen (2005), that a coverage-risk 
correlation exists only for experienced drivers. If this were the case, older drivers who 
have had an opportunity to learn about their risk type, would purchase a level of 
deductible which depends on their own risk, that is high-risk types would choose a low 
deductible and be associated to more accidents. Insurers should, of course, sell such a 
policy at a higher price than another with higher deductible.  Inexperienced drivers, on 
the other hand, still have to learn about their risk type and are more likely to purchase 
an incoherent insurance coverage. Thus, if there is an anomaly such as the one we 
observe, it is more likely to arise in this subset of insurers.       
However, in general since the proportion of policies that potentially satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint is large, it is possible that behaviour by most agents within the 
CP market is consistent with adverse selection models.  We are able to say a little more 
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than this, as the ECJ ruling on unisex pricing is a natural experiment resulting in 
increased asymmetry of information due to the fact that a major risk factor could no 
longer be used to price policies in 2013.10  This increase in asymmetry of contractible 
information should result in a decrease in the trade-off between price and deductible.  
To see this consider first Figure 1, which shows the market for male policies in 2012 when 
firms sell different policies to men and women and where, for simplicity of exposition, 
we assume that there are only two risk types for each gender.  Within the male market 
there is still adverse selection as there are both high-risk and low-risk men.  In the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz version of the market, if the proportion of high risk individuals is 
high enough, a separating equilibrium is achieved by high risk males buying full 
insurance (the contract on the 45° line) and low-risk males buying the partial insurance 
contract where the indifference curve of the high risk males cuts the low-risk break-even 
condition for providers.11  On the figure we highlight the difference in the price of the 
two policies and the difference in the deductible, which should be negative.  We are 
interested in the ratio of the difference-in-deductible to the difference-in-price :  
(1) 
Low risk
High risk Low risk
Deductible Deductible
Price Price Price
0                
 
which is the slope of a line drawn between the two contracts. 
                                                 
10 Finkelstein et al. (2009) discuss the possible consequences of banning gender-based 
insurance in the UK annuity market (where, like the car insurance market, it is 
compulsory to purchase insurance), but in their model there is no price anomaly.  
Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) provides some evidence of the effects of a move in the 
opposite direction, namely the change to gender-priced car insurance permitted in Italy 
after 1995.  Schmeiser et al. (2013) discuss other possible consequences of the abolition 
of gender-based pricing in the European Union. 
11 If the proportion of high risk individuals is low, then the separating contracts cannot 
be an equilibrium and the equilibrium may not exist at all, although this depends on the 
responses of firms to each others’ contracts (Wilson, 1977) in which case there may be a 
pooling equilibrium.  It is also possible for there to be a separating equilibrium with 
contracts still obeying the positive correlation property but with cross subsidisation 
(Miyazaki, 1977; Spence, 1978). 
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Figure 1 (price and deductible in the male-only market) about here 
Now consider the imposition of unisex pricing, which will introduce two new types: 
high-risk females and low-risk females.  The pricing of female and male policies in 2012 
suggests that high-risk females are less risky than high-risk males and it seems 
reasonable to assume that they are riskier than low-risk males, so they will be an 
intermediate risk type.  For these three risk types the insurance provider must provide 
three policies illustrated in Figure 2.  Figure 2 is the same as Figure 1 except for the 
addition of a further break-even condition (denoted by a dashed line) and indifference 
curve for the high-risk females.12   
Figure 2 (price and deductible in the unisex market) about here 
From Figure 2 we can see that the trade-off between deductible and price is larger both 
if we compare high-risk males and low-risk males or high-risk males and high-risk 
females.  The trade-off between high-risk males and low-risk males becomes larger 
because the old low-risk male policy is no longer available and low-risk males have to 
buy the new policy where the high-risk female indifference curve cuts the low-risk 
break-even condition.  Since (with indifference curves satisfying the single-crossing 
property) this is further down the break-even condition, it is clear that the trade-off is 
now larger. 
To compare high-risk males with the high-risk females, note that the contract for high-
risk females must lie on the indifference curve for high-risk males at the point shown.  
Since the indifference curve is convex to the origin, it follows that this new policy also 
has a higher trade-off. 
To see the effect of unisex pricing we estimate regressions for each CP policy type (age-
occupation-gender) of the form 
(2)    Min DeductibleDeductible Min Deductible Price Price, 0 1 , ,ji j j i j j i j        
                                                 
12 We omit low-risk females from the diagram for simplicity: their contract would be 
somewhere above the male low-risk contract line. Note that the non-existence problem 
becomes more severe in this case, since pairs of cross-subsidising contracts could be 
profitable deviations from the separating contracts. 
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where Min Deductible
j
 is the lowest excess allowed by provider j , Min DeductiblePrice j
j
 is the 
corresponding price and  Price Deductible, ,,i j i j  are all of the price-deductible 
combinations offered by provider j  for that policy type.  Equation (2) is similar to 
estimating the relationship with fixed effects; given the anomaly already mentioned, we 
know that there is some reason to suspect non-linearity but, given the small range of 
deductibles, we do not attempt to identify this. 
Since the price and deductible are presumably set simultaneously by providers on the 
basis of unobserved random variables also correlated with the error term 
,i j
 , the least 
squares estimator of 1  maybe an inconsistent estimator of the true price-deductible 
relationship and we do not have any excludable instruments to attempt to identify the 
trade-off.  However, as a check we also estimate 
(3)    Min DeductiblePrice Price Deductible Min Deductible, 0 1 , ,ji j j i j j i j        
We report our results of the regressions for Solicitors in Table 5: results for other 
occupations are similar. 
Table 5 (price-deductible relationship) about here 
From the first panel of the table, we compare the coefficients for the male and female 
quotes in 2012 and the unisex quotes in 2013.  The trade-off between price and deductible 
is larger in 2013 for both 23- and 44-year olds, but the effect is neither large nor 
statistically significant.  However, this is estimated for all providers and we know that 
some firms are offering much higher prices than others: if the prices represent monopoly 
power, then the break-even constraint is not binding and it may be less important for 
such firms to separate out the risk types.  So in the second panel we repeat the analysis 
for just those firms whose prices are in the lowest quartile and where separating out the 
two risk types is presumably more important.  The effect for 23-year olds is now very 
large – whereas the deductible rises by £1.73 or £1.34 for every reduction in premium in 
2012, in 2013 it rises by £4.36, and the difference is statistically significant.  We recognize 
that there may be endogeneity bias, but estimating the regression in the other direction 
leads to a statistically significant fall in the price-deductible ratio. 
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The effect for 44-year olds is smaller and remains statistically insignificant in regression 
(2).  However, this is less surprising.  The difference in the level of prices for 44-year old 
males and 44-year old females from the same provider is small, suggesting that the 
difference in risk between males and females at this age is very low: it may be that high-
risk males are similar risk to high-risk females and similarly for the low risks.  In which 
case, losing the ability to price off gender for 44-year olds makes little difference and 
hence there is no need to increase the trade-off between price and deductible. 
3. Discussion and Interpretation 
We now turn to possible explanations of our data.  We do not present a formal model, 
but instead discuss what conditions would need to be met for agents’ actions in the 
insurance market to result in an equilibrium such as the one we observe. We need to 
consider three groups of actors: consumers, insurers and other agents who might 
provide information. 
3.1 Behaviour of consumers 
We start with the consumers of car insurance, since their behaviour is the crux of the 
matter: why would they buy TP insurance if it were dearer than CP?  We suggest that 
there are three necessary conditions: first, many consumers do not initially believe that 
TP is dearer than CP; second, that search behaviour is insufficient to reveal the anomaly 
to more than an insignificant group of consumers; and third, that high-risk types have 
different search behaviour from low-risk types. 
A prior belief that CP is dearer than TP is reasonable: ceteris paribus CP insurance should 
be dearer.  The way that internet search engines were configured during this period 
would not necessarily disabuse a consumer of this belief, since search results presented 
a comparison of either all TP or all CP policies, depending on an initial choice: to 
compare TP and CP one would need to do two searches. Furthermore there is 
independent evidence that price comparison websites were confusing to many 
consumers and could be manipulated by insurers: websites  ‘… did not present sufficient 
product information in a clear and consistent way to ensure consumers were given 
appropriate information to allow them to make informed decisions … This finding 
applies to both the core policy and add-on products’ (Financial Conduct Authority, 2014, 
p.4).   
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Advice in magazines and on MoneySupermarket’s own website did not draw attention 
to the anomaly between TP and CP.13  For example, the MoneySupermarket website 
dated 25 June 2013 had an article listing five ways to reduce one’s premium: (i) shop 
around; (ii) protect one’s no-claim discount; (iii) increase security of one’s car by 
keeping it off the road or in a garage; (iv) manage one’s policy (e.g. by adjusting reported 
miles driven so that it is not too high); (v) use telematics (i.e. have a black-box recorder 
in the car to monitor driving behaviour).  The possibility of switching from TP to CP was 
not mentioned.   We also looked at other contemporary websites to see what information 
was in the public domain. The strongest suggestion that we could find that CP might be 
cheaper than TP was in the ‘This Is Money’ website associated with the newspaper the 
Daily Mail (circulation 1.8 million), which said ‘Although third party insurance should 
be cheapest for young drivers as it offers a lower level of cover, this isn't always the rule.’ 
There is independent evidence that consumers are generally confused about car 
insurance policies and so consumers may be unclear what they are buying or may not 
get the best advice possible from car insurers.  The most extreme case is ‘mis-selling’ 
which, in the UK context, is the use by insurance providers of aggressive sales techniques 
(frequently involving mis-information) to sell products that are unsuitable: one of the 
companies in our sample, Swinton, was fined £7 million and required to set aside £11 
million compensation on policies totalling £93 million during this period (Financial 
Conduct Authority, 2013).   
Confusion may arise due to differences in policies offered by insurers: since insurance 
companies offer up to five ‘extras’, we know that the policies cover different things.  One 
of the five extras in our data set is ‘legal cover’, but it is probably unclear what this means 
when using a search engine.  Financial Services Authority (2013) explains that the full 
name for ‘legal cover’ is Motor Legal Expenses Insurance (MLEI) and that it provides 
extra legal assistance in recovering losses when the fault is that of another party and 
                                                 
13 In 31 July 2013 the MoneySupermarket website page discussing whether to buy TPFT 
or CP stated ‘Third party, fire and theft cover is usually cheaper than comprehensive 
cover, but it doesn't cover your own car’. Since we finished writing this paper the 
webpage has been amended to say that ‘in some cases, especially those involving young 
drivers, fully comprehensive insurance cover can be cheaper than third party insurance’.  
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there is difficulty in claiming from that other party’s TP insurance.  If the other party is 
not insured or cannot be traced then the injured party is refunded by the Motor 
Insurance Bureau, so MLEI is only relevant in a small number of cases where the guilty 
party is known but the insurer will not pay.  However, four-fifths of the 1021 respondents 
in the FSA’s survey of policy holders thought that MLEI paid legal costs when it was the 
insured party (i.e. themselves) that was at fault rather than the other party.  The overall 
conclusion of the FSA survey was that many purchasers of car insurance did not really 
know what they had purchased: for example the quote from a respondent described as 
aged 40-60 years, higher financial confidence, with MLEI: ‘You see all these options but 
you don’t really know what they are for’ (FSA, 2013, p. 15).  In further comments in the 
survey, the FSA noted that those who purchased MLEI tended to be more cautious while 
those who did not tended to be more optimistic. 
All of this qualitative evidence is corroborative evidence for the first two conditions that 
we have stipulated that many consumers might not realize that TP was dearer than CP 
and that searching for prices using information available might not make this clear.  
The third condition is that search behaviour of high- and low-risk individuals must be 
different: if search behaviour were the same then the two types would compare the same 
set of policies and hence presumably purchase the same policies. In particular high-risk 
types (or most high-risk types) must search only within TP policies, since they would 
deviate from purchasing TP if they saw CP prices.  
One possibility is that different risk types initially search among the policy types that 
they eventually purchase. We have already noted that attitudes towards risk and 
underlying risk characteristics might be correlated (De Meza and Webb, 2001; De 
Donder and Hindriks, 2009) and that low-risk individuals are probably more risk averse. 
In which case low-risk individuals might be more likely to look purely at CP policies 
(since they have a greater desire for insurance) while high-risk less-risk-averse 
individuals might just look at TP (since they wrongly anticipate that the additional cost 
of CP would be higher than would be merited by their lower utility from insurance). The 
other possibility is that risk-averse low-risk individuals might have other character traits 
(such as searching more carefully or at greater length) so that they would collect more 
information and thus be more likely to find CP was cheaper than TP. High-risk types 
who assumed TP was cheaper than CP would search in TP and then not bother to search 
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in CP (given the high cost of TP they might reasonably assume that CP would be 
unaffordable). 
3.2 Behaviour of insurers 
We now turn to the behaviour of sellers of car insurance.  Given the magnitude of the 
difference in price for TP and CP policies it is implausible that differences between 
advertized and actual prices could lead to the ordering of prices actually paid being 
reversed.  Furthermore it is not clear that firms have any incentive to quote prices which 
are the reverse of what they actually charge. 
Assuming that the advertized prices are indicative of actual prices, insurance companies 
are offering prices that do not satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint. Given 
consumers’ behaviour this need not matter, but we still need to ask whether firms have 
incentives to deviate from existing prices. 
If an individual insurer raised prices of CP policies, then this would be visible to 
consumers since the web search engine shows the prices for all firms for a given policy 
type. This means that if an insurer raises price it will sell fewer policies. The fact that 
firms charge different prices suggests that they have some market power: well-known 
firms may be able to trade on their brand, perhaps because they are believed to offer a 
better service. Overall, it is highly likely that the demand curve for each firm is 
downward sloping. Many insurers will not wish to lose market share: for those firms 
(such as supermarkets) who are trying to break in to the market, this would be the 
opposite of what is wanted.  
Alternatively an insurer could lower TP prices, which presumably would increase the 
insurer’s share of the TP market. There are two reasons to think that this might not be 
optimal. If TP policies are priced appropriately on actuarial grounds, then lowering 
prices too much would lead to policies making losses. In addition, insurers might not 
wish to increase the proportion of their policies which are TP policies because TP 
policies might be riskier and there is some evidence to suggest that the largest claims 
tend to be made on TP policies.14 During the period we are analysing insurers were 
                                                 
14 Informal discussion with people who work in the industry suggests that car insurers 
believe this to be the case. For example, one individual said: ‘I think that most companies 
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beginning to be affected by Solvency II regulation which explicitly required firms to hold 
more capital against riskier policies and hence firms might decide that CP policies were 
less expensive.15  
So it is plausible that firms have no incentive to raise CP prices or lower TP prices: so 
long as consumers do not change their behaviour, the fact that prices are inconsistent 
with the incentive-compatibility constraint is irrelevant. We can go further than this 
and suggest how such a pattern of prices might arise in the first place.  Ania et al. (2002) 
describe a model where car insurers have bounded rationality and do not know risk 
probabilities. In this model firms offer a menu of contracts, withdrawing unprofitable 
contracts and occasionally experimenting with new contacts: so long as consumers are 
rational and make appropriate choices, the market evolves to a unique equilibrium 
which is the same as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Ania et al. (2002) do not discuss 
what would happen if consumers’ behaviour were also characterized by bounded 
rationality, but it is plausible that one potential outcome would be the pattern of prices 
that we observe in the UK.16  
                                                 
now would prefer not to write TP/TPFT. It attracts the most risky business as I intimated 
– either young drivers who are most likely to make a serious injury claim (claims in 
excess of £4m are not unknown by any means) or people driving very old, poorly 
maintained cars which by definition are more likely to end up having a crash perhaps 
due to a fault and the attitude of the driver who perhaps doesn’t really care if his clapped 
out old banger ends up in a collision.’ However, it should be noted that our CP and TP 
quotes were for the same car, so the last selection effect (quality of car) does not affect 
our data. 
15 Solvency II regulation is described in European Parliament (2009): article 101 notes 
that value-at-risk measures affect the amount of capital that needs to be held. Policies 
with potentially large claims would be the riskiest on the value-at-risk definition. The 
precise details of how this would affect an insurer depend upon whether or how the 
Modigliani-Miller assumptions were violated, but we should expect all prices to include 
a risk premium, with a higher premium for riskier TP  policies. Cannon and Tonks (2013) 
discuss the effect of Solvency II legislation on tests for adverse selection in the annuity 
market. 
16 Yet a further possibility analysed in Villeneuve (2005) is that the adverse selection is 
the other way around, i.e. that sellers have more information than purchasers, but the 
result of that model is that high-risk types purchasing no insurance at all, consistent 
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As we have seen, the pricing anomaly is not confined to the comparison between the TP 
and CP market: there are also a small number of providers who charge more for a higher 
deductible.  As with the TP-CP phenomenon, it is possible that most consumers think 
that asking for a deductible is a good way to reduce the price: indeed money advice 
columns explicitly say this.  Since the desired voluntary deductible is one of the pieces 
of information that must be provided on an internet search engine, a consumer would 
never see the prices for alternative deductibles unless they conducted a selection of 
searches which would have to include a zero deductible (as there is a negative 
relationship between price and deductible for all other deductibles).  It is possible that 
only the most risk-averse and hence cautious drivers would ask for a zero deductible, in 
which case charging a lower price would adequately reflect the risk. 
3.3 Behaviour of other agents 
We have discussed why both consumers and insurers might continue in an equilibrium 
where TP prices are higher than CP. This raises the question of whether any other agents 
could undermine the equilibrium by appropriate arbitrage. In principle newspapers or 
advice columns could provide such information, but we have already noted that they 
seem not to have done so. An alternative possibility is that insurance brokers (i.e. 
financial advisors) could have acted as arbitrageurs. However, it is unsurprising that 
they did not do so. First, the consumers who would benefit from arbitrage are the 
purchasers of TP policies, and this was a relatively small part of the market, so potential 
demand would have been relatively low. Second, this was a period when insurance 
broking was in decline because consumers were by-passing brokers and using 
comparison websites. If consumers believed that the additional fees charged by brokers 
would exceed any benefit from better search and knowledge by brokers then it would 
not be irrational to use a website and not pay a broker. 
4. Conclusion 
We have shown that there are substantial, persistent and durable anomalies in the 
pricing of the UK car insurance market: in particular, CP policies are cheaper than TP 
                                                 
with evidence from New Zealand, where car insurance is voluntary (Blows et al, 2003), 
but not with the pattern of prices we observe. 
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policies.  This is even true when comparing policies that are otherwise identical (quotes 
for the same individual with same characteristics for the same car from the same 
provider).  Despite the anomaly, the TP and TPFT policies form a significant minority of 
the market.  There is also evidence for a smaller anomaly within the CP market in that 
the price of a policy with a £100 deductible is more than for one with no deductible. 
Within the CP market there is evidence for pricing consistent with the adverse-selection 
of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model after the ECJ ruling: if firms had responded to the 
inability to price separately for the two genders by merely averaging the two policy types, 
the deductible-price trade-off would have been an average of the male and female trade-
offs, but in fact they responded by increasing the deductible-price trade-off for 23-year-
olds (where gender is a strong indicator of risk). The fact that CP policies are cheaper 
than TP policies is so surprising that many readers will have difficulty in believing it.17  
So it is likely that unsophisticated consumers have similar prior beliefs that CP policies 
are more expensive.  So long as aversion to risk is negatively correlated with risk type 
(propitious selection) and car insurers respond merely by offering menus of contracts 
which are profitable (as in Ania et al., 2002), this could result in low risk types buying 
more insurance and, in the most extreme cases, result in TP policies being more 
expensive for car insurers due to TP policy holders being so much more risky than CP 
policy holders.  This appears to be what has happened in the UK car insurance market. 
We should expect such an anomaly not to persist for long periods of time, but this 
anomaly has existed for almost two years in the UK and persisted despite a large shock 
to the market that might have been expected advice columns in newspapers and 
magazines to notice the anomaly and draw it to consumers’ attention.  How much longer 
the anomaly will last is anyone’s guess. 
Supplementary material  
Supplementary material (the Appendix) is available online at the OUP website. 
                                                 
17 Although only anecdotal, we observe that seminar participants and colleagues have 
found it difficult to believe. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Average car insurance premiums 
 2012  2013 
 Male 
Age 23 
Female 
Age 23 
Male 
Age 44 
Female 
Age 44 
 Unisex 
Age 23 
Unisex 
Age 44 
Third-party policies        
Mean premium 2694 1816 797 704  1894 686 
Cheapest decile 
premium 1541 627 326 269 
 1348 345 
Standard deviation 894 652 291 270  478 181 
No. of observations 153 180 180 182  113 132 
Comprehensive policies        
Mean premium 1533 1142 453 425  1122 375 
Cheapest decile 
premium 1047 826 313 309 
 786 267 
Standard deviation 395 290 118 103  270 194 
No. of observations 1067 1176 1275 1311  726 868 
Statistics are calculated across all occupations and levels of deductible and are in pounds 
sterling rounded to the nearest pound. Not all companies quoted for both TP and CP 
and some companies only quoted for women in 2012. 
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Table 2: Average prices of extras where available as an option 
Extra sample 
size 
price 
(£) 
proportion of CP policies that 
automatically include extra vis-á-vis 
corresponding TP policy not 
automatically including extra 
Windscreen 1 20.00 86% 
Courtesy car 3 18.29 86% 
Breakdown 71 42.41 2% 
Personal accident 6 21.11 82% 
Legal cover 57 27.50 0% 
‘Windscreen’ refers to insurance against a broken windscreen from any cause. ‘Courtesy 
car’ means that the insurer provides a car while the insured’s car is being mended. 
‘Breakdown’ refers to on-road repairs being provided. ‘Personal accident’ provides 
compensation for injury or death after a vehicle accident when the insured cannot claim 
from a third party. ‘Legal cover’ is discussed in section 3.   
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Table 3: Comparison of TP and CP prices for Solicitors 
  All quotes  Matched pairs  Cheapest  
Age Gender, year Mean 
difference 
 Mean 
difference 
Inter-decile 
range 
 Mean 
difference 
23 Men, 2012 1150 
(73) 
 1078 
(76) 
803 – 1432 
 
 1359 
(286) 
 Women, 2012 818 
(55) 
 775 
(59) 
0 – 1133 
 
 695 
(224) 
 Unisex, 2013 770 
(79) 
 790 
(77) 
343 – 1114 
 
 1057 
(102) 
44 Men, 2012 384 
(24) 
 354 
(25) 
100 – 556 
 
 381 
(61) 
 Women, 2012 302 
(24) 
 287 
(22) 
112 – 457 
 
 279 
(52) 
 Unisex, 2013 308 
(34) 
 368 
(26) 
25 – 487 
 
 415 
(42) 
All figures are in pounds sterling.  The first column reports the difference in the mean 
price of all third-party and all comprehensive policies: sample sizes range from 113 to 143 
and standard errors are clustered by provider (of which there are between 78 and 92). 
The second and third columns are based on price differences between third-party and 
comprehensive for those providers that quote both policy types, with sample sizes 
ranging from 34 to 48.  In all cases the comprehensive policy used to compare the third-
party and comprehensive policy is the one with the minimum excess.  The fourth column 
uses the subset of the matched-pairs data for which prices are in the cheapest quartile.  
 
 
  
25 
 
Table 4: Proportion of policies with anomalous price and deductible (Solicitors) 
 Male, 2012 Female, 2012 Unisex, 2013 
All policies 
Age 23 0.377 
(0.059) 
0.300 
(0.060) 
0.179 
(0.047) 
Age 44 0.076 
(0.030) 
0.134 
(0.038) 
0.042 
(0.024) 
Cheapest policies 
Age 23 0.067 
(0.067) 
0.267 
(0.118) 
0 
(-) 
Age 44 0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
Figures show the proportion of policies where the price for a £100-deductible policy is 
more expensive than the price for the corresponding zero-deductible policy; standard 
errors of the proportions are in parentheses to assist comparison of different proportions 
with each other.  Cheapest policies are defined as those in the cheapest quartile.  Figures 
for Civil Engineers and Social Service Managers are very similar and differ mainly due to 
occasional missing data. 
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Table 5: Relationship between price and deductible (Solicitors) 
 Male, 2012 Female, 2012 Unisex, 2013 
Regressions of deductible on price (equation 2) – all policies 
Age 23 -0.978 
(0.117) 
-1.015 
(0.108) 
-1.280 
(0.124) 
Age 44  -2.944 
(0.391) 
-2.969 
(0.422) 
-3.200 
(0.626) 
Regressions of deductible on price (equation 2) – cheapest policies only 
Age 23 -1.730 
(0.238) 
-1.342 
(0.214) 
-4.361 
(0.514) 
Age 44  -4.794 
(1.035) 
-3.866 
(0.585) 
-6.121 
(3.542) 
Regressions of price on deductible (equation 3) – all policies 
Age 23 -0.273 
(0.030) 
-0.204 
(0.026) 
-0.205 
(0.034) 
Age 44 -0.092 
(0.010) 
-0.085 
(0.009) 
-0.078 
(0.009) 
Regressions of price on deductible (equation 3) – cheapest policies only 
Age 23 -0.295 
(0.046) 
-0.194 
(0.039) 
-0.100 
(0.032) 
Age 44 -0.080 
(0.011) 
-0.086 
(0.012) 
-0.035 
(0.010) 
Each cell shows the parameter estimate from a different regression of the forms specified 
in equations (2) or (3).  Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by provider.  Cheapest policies are defined as those in the cheapest 
quartile.  Figures for Civil Engineers and Social Service Managers are very similar. 
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Figure 1: Price and deductible in male-only market 
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Figure 2: Effect on price-deductible relationship with unisex pricing 
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